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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
We are asked to decide whether a statute whose text is 
unchanged by a later act of Congress can nevertheless be said 
to have been “modified” by that enactment.  Although the 
question might seem simple, getting to an answer is not, and 
the analysis may have significant implications for many 
federal prisoners. 
 
Jamell Birt contends that he is one such prisoner.  He 
appeals the District Court’s denial of his request for a lower 
sentence pursuant to the First Step Act (the “Act”).  As he 
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sees it, his conviction for possession with intent to distribute 
crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), 
qualifies as a “covered offense” under the Act and so he is 
entitled to resentencing.  We disagree.  “Covered offenses,” 
as the First Step Act defines that term, are offenses proscribed 
by criminal statutes that have had their penalty provisions 
modified by another statute, specifically the Fair Sentencing 
Act.  But the penalties for Birt’s statute of conviction have 
not been modified, and, without such a modification, the First 
Step Act has no applicability to Birt’s case.  We will therefore 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
In 2001, Birt was arrested following a routine traffic 
stop in Pennsylvania.  He consented to a search of his car, and 
a state trooper found 186.5 grams of crack cocaine in the 
trunk.   
 
Birt originally faced state charges and was released on 
bail.  But after violating the conditions of his release, he was 
charged in federal court.  Ultimately, the United States 
Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania filed a 
superseding information charging him with one count of 
possession with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of 
crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  Birt 
eventually pled guilty to that charge, and his plea agreement 
stated that “[t]he maximum penalty for [his] offense is 
imprisonment for a period of 20 years [and] a fine of $1 
million dollars,” as well as a period of supervised release and 
various costs and collateral consequences.  (App. at 18.)  
Those penalties are set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).  
The probation office then issued a Presentence Report noting 
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that, as stated in that statutory subsection, Birt’s maximum 
sentence was 20 years.  In due course, the District Court 
imposed the maximum sentence, which we affirmed on 
appeal.1   
 
Years later, Birt filed a motion to reduce his sentence 
pursuant to Amendment 750 to the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, an “amendment[] which lowered the base offense 
levels applicable to crack cocaine offenses.”  United States v. 
Savani, 733 F.3d 56, 58 (3d Cir. 2013).  The District Court 
granted that motion in early 2012, and reduced Birt’s 
sentence to 210 months.  We also affirmed that order.   
 
Another few years passed and Birt filed another 
motion for resentencing, this time based on the First Step Act.  
The government originally conceded that Birt was entitled to 
relief but subsequently withdrew that concession and argued 
that no resentencing was in order.  The District Court agreed, 
deciding that Birt was not convicted of a “covered offense” 
within the meaning of the Act and, thus, that he was not 
entitled to relief.   
 
1 In a prior opinion, we summarized Birt’s sentencing, 
noting that he “was a career offender with a criminal history 
category of VI and an adjusted total offense level of 34, 
yielding an advisory guidelines range of 262 to 327 months.  
The District Court imposed the statutory maximum of 240 
months.”  United States v. Birt, 479 F. App’x 445, 446 (3d 
Cir. 2012). 
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This timely appeal followed. 
 
II. DISCUSSION2 
 
The issue before us is one of statutory interpretation.  
As noted earlier, Birt was convicted and sentenced under 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) for possession with intent to 
distribute an unspecified quantity of crack cocaine.  We must 
determine whether those two subsections, acting in concert, 
qualify as a “covered offense” within the meaning of the First 
Step Act.3   
 
A. The Applicable Statutes 
 
To answer that question we need to consider the 
interaction of three statutes: the Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3582(c)(1).  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Our 
review over a district court’s decision to grant or deny a 
motion for sentence reduction is typically for abuse of 
discretion.  However, … we exercise plenary review [when] 
we are presented with legal questions[.]”  United States v. 
Thompson, 825 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  That is what we face now. 
 
3 In determining whether a conviction constitutes a 
“covered offense,” we focus on the statute of conviction, not 
the specific actions of the offender.  United States v. Harris, 
No. 19-2517, 2020 WL3563995, --F.3d -- (3d Cir. 2020). 
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No. 111-220; the retroactivity provision of the First Step Act; 
and the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act under 
which Birt was convicted, namely 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 
(b)(1)(C). 
 
The Fair Sentencing Act was passed to reduce the 
disparities in sentencing between crack cocaine and powder 
cocaine offenses.  Pub. L. No. 111–220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 
2372 (2010).  It reduced the crack/powder ratio from 100:1 to 
approximately 18:1.  United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 
197 (3d Cir. 2011).  The amounts of crack cocaine needed to 
trigger statutory minimum sentences were also changed, by 
amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B).  Prior to 
the Fair Sentencing Act, section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) imposed a 
minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum sentence of 
life for an offense involving 50 grams or more of crack.  
Section 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) imposed a minimum sentence of 5 
years and a maximum sentence of 40 years for an offense 
involving 5 grams or more of crack.  The Fair Sentencing Act 
modified the language of those provisions to replace “50” 
with “280” and “5” with “28.”  Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 
Stat. 2372 (2010).  By contrast, the penalty provision for 
offenses involving an unspecified quantity of drugs, 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), was unchanged. 
 
The amendments to subsections (b)(1)(A) and 
(b)(1)(B) of § 841 were not at first retroactive.  Consequently, 
those who were sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act 
went into effect had dramatically higher sentences than those 
who were sentenced later for the same crimes.  Congress 
sought to rectify that disparity when it passed the First Step 
Act.  Section 404 of that statute allows a district court, when 
considering a defense motion aimed at a sentence for a 
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“covered offense,” to “impose a reduced sentence as if 
sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in 
effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” First 
Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 
(2018).  The term “covered offense” is defined as “a violation 
of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which 
were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010, that was committed before August 3, 2010.”  First Step 
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222.  
The First Step Act thus made it possible for some prisoners to 
seek reduced sentences, even if they had been sentenced prior 
to the effective date of the Fair Sentencing Act. 
 
B. The Meaning of “Covered Offense” 
 
The text of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) – 
the statutory provisions comprising Birt’s crime of conviction 
– was, as just noted, untouched by the Fair Sentencing Act.  
That text remains the same to the last letter.  On its face, then, 
it is not apparent how a conviction under those subsections 
could qualify as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the 
statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 
of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010[.]”  First Step Act, Pub. L. 
115-391, § 404(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018).  Since 
“modify” and “change” are close synonyms, something that is 
completely unchanged has not, in ordinary parlance, been 
“modified.”  See Change, Merriam-Webster.com Thesaurus, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/change, 
accessed 23 Jun. 2020 (listing “modify” as a synonym for 
“change”). 
 
Birt attacks that textual fact in two ways.  First, he 
argues that his statute of conviction is § 841(a)(1), not the 
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combination of subsections (a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).  Viewed in 
that light, he says, his statute of conviction was modified by 
the Fair Sentencing Act, since some of the penalty provisions 
associated with § 841(a)(1) were modified, even if subsection 
(b)(1)(C) was not.  Second, he argues that, assuming his 
conviction is held to be one under a combination of 
subsections (a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), the way in which (b)(1)(C) 
is affected by changes to the other penalty provisions in § 841 
means that those changes necessarily served to modify 
(b)(1)(C) as well.  We disagree on both points. 
 
1. The relevant substantive provision is the 
combination of § 841(a)(1) and 
§ 841(b)(1)(C).  
Birt’s statute of conviction is a tight combination of 
subsections (a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) of § 841, not § 841(a)(1) in 
isolation or § 841 as a whole.  That conclusion becomes 
apparent when we consider the structure of § 841 in 
conjunction with relevant Supreme Court precedent. 
 
Section 841 is framed as a general prohibition on 
certain kinds of conduct, followed by a list of penalties 
corresponding to the particular manner in which the 
prohibition is violated.  Subsection (a)(1), titled “[u]nlawful 
acts,” prohibits the “manufacture, distribut[ion], or 
dispens[ing], or possess[ion] with intent to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance[.]”  21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1).  That provision was not changed by the Fair 
Sentencing Act.  Section 841(b), titled “[p]enalties[,]” lays 
out, in turn, the consequences for violating § 841(a).  Id. 
§ 841(b).  Those consequences vary based on the type of 
controlled substance at issue and the quantity of the 
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controlled substance.  The subsections dealing with crack 
cocaine are (b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B)(iii), and (b)(1)(C).4  As 
previously stated, subsection (b)(1)(A)(iii) imposes a 
mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment and a 
maximum of life for an offense involving 280 grams or more 
of crack.  Again, it had been 50 grams, prior to the passage of 
the Fair Sentencing Act.  Subsection (b)(1)(B)(iii) imposes a 
mandatory minimum of 5 years and a maximum of 40 years 
for an offense involving 28 grams or more of crack, and, 
before the Fair Sentencing Act, that trigger had been 5 grams.  
Lastly, subsection (b)(1)(C) imposes a statutory maximum of 
20 years, and no mandatory minimum, for an offense 
involving an unspecified amount of crack, as it did before the 
Fair Sentencing Act. 
 
Birt asserts that this statutory structure means that “all 
defendants convicted under Section[] 841(a)(1) … are eligible 
for a reduced sentence.”  (Opening Br. at 16-17).  He argues 
that because § 841(a) lays out the proscribed conduct and 
then § 841(b) lays out the penalties for that conduct, the 
necessary conclusion is that the offense of conviction is § 
841(a).  And because the Fair Sentencing Act undoubtedly 
modified the penalties section (that is to say, it modified parts 
of § 841(b)), a violation of § 841(a) counts as “a violation of 
a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which 
were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 
 
4 Unlike subsections (b)(1)(A)(iii) and (b)(1)(B)(iii) of 
§ 841, which are both directed expressly to offenses involving 
cocaine base, subsection (b)(1)(C) deals with controlled 
substance offenses more generally, including those involving 
cocaine base. 
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2010[.]”  First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(a), 132 
Stat. 5194, 5222.  Birt thus believes he committed a “covered 
offense” within the meaning of the First Step Act and is 
entitled to resentencing. 
 
That reasoning is not implausible.  Indeed, it is 
plausible enough that it was adopted by one of our sister 
circuits.  The United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit concluded that the “relevant statute … violated is 
either § 841 as a whole, or § 841(a), which describes all the 
conduct necessary to violate § 841.  Section 841(b)(1), in 
turn, sets forth how the penalties for that conduct vary based 
on drug quantity.” United States v. Smith, 954 F.3d 446, 449 
(1st Cir. 2020).  Our conclusion, however, is different, 
because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alleyne v. United 
States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 
 
Building on the principle laid out in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Alleyne held that “[a]ny fact 
that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ 
that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” 570 U.S. at 103.   So, under Alleyne, any 
fact that legally requires an increased penalty is an element of 
the substantive crime itself.  And if it is necessary to prove 
different facts for there to be different penalties, then there are 
different crimes, not merely the same crime with different 
penalties.   
 
Section 841(a) doesn’t contain any reference to 
penalties.  Those are set forth in § 841(b), and the facts 
necessary to impose them must be proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Thus, depending on the subsection of 
841(b) implicated by a defendant’s charging document, 
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different facts must be presented to the jury in order for the 
government to meet its burden of proof, as required by 
Alleyne.  If, for example, the indictment or information 
charging the defendant specifies the amount of crack that is 
involved in the offense, then reference must be made to the 
subsections of § 841(b)(1) to determine the pertinent drug 
quantity thresholds and what the government must prove to 
come within those thresholds.  It follows that “21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A), § 841(b)(1)(B), and § 841(b)(1)(C) are each 
distinct crimes.” United States v. Williams, 402 F. Supp. 3d 
442, 449 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (emphasis omitted); cf. United 
States v. Shaw, 957 F.3d 734, 739-40 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding 
that defendants could seek relief under the First Step Act 
because they were convicted under § 841(b)(1)(A) and 
841(b)(1)(B) and “the penalty for each of those crimes was 
modified by the Fair Sentencing Act”) (emphasis added).  We 
are therefore left to conclude that Birt’s crime of conviction is 
defined by a combination of § 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(C).   
 
That conclusion is not altered by the fact that Birt’s 
charging document lists only the violation of § 841(a)(1) as 
his crime.  That is conceptually incomplete for purposes of 
both prosecution responsibilities and the First Step Act.  As 
just discussed, § 841(a) does not contain the drug thresholds 
that are integral to defining what are, after Alleyne, distinct 
crimes.  It is thus, in our view, not true that “§ 841(a)… 
describes all the conduct necessary to violate § 841[,]” as the 
First Circuit has asserted.  Smith, 954 F.3d at 449.  Depending 
on the charge, an additional part of the statute must be 
accounted for and proof offered for there to be conviction of a 
crime.  Because the charging instrument in this case did not 
specify an amount of crack cocaine, the only subsection that 
can fill that role is § 841(b)(1)(C).  Thus, although the 
12 
 
superseding information did not explicitly reference 
§ 841(b)(1)(C), the necessary inference is that Birt was 
prosecuted for a crime defined in part by that subsection.  
That conclusion is bolstered by the PSR’s explicit reliance on 
(b)(1)(C) to establish the maximum sentence to which Birt 
was exposed.5 
 
The First Circuit rejected that kind of reasoning.  It 
dismissed Alleyne as being merely concerned with criminal 
procedure, and it said that there was “no reason to believe that 
Congress would have thought the holding in Alleyne” had any 
bearing on the questions raised by the First Step Act.  Smith, 
954 F.3d at 450.  But Alleyne is no narrow procedural ruling.  
It is a landmark constitutional decision that redefined what 
constitutes an element of a crime and thus what constitutes 
the crime itself.  There is no reason not to believe that 
Congress knew such a significant ruling would affect the 
interpretation of legislation addressing penalties for drug 
dealing.  See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 
(1990) (“We assume that Congress is aware of existing law 
when it passes legislation.”).  The point of the First Step Act 
was to ameliorate certain penalties, including mandatory 
minimums, attached to drug dealing.  See First Step Act, Pub. 
L. 115-391, § 401, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220 (stating, in a related 
section, that part of the effect of the First Step Act is to 
 
5 Birt was, of course, convicted long before the 
decision in Alleyne was handed down, so prosecutors had no 
reason at the time to consider the necessity of listing the 
pertinent penalty subsection of § 841 to complete the 
description of the crime. 
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“reduce and restrict enhanced sentencing for prior drug 
felonies”). 
 
Moreover, the reading that Birt and our sister circuit 
give the First Step Act would have serious and unintended 
consequences.  Every defendant convicted under § 841(a) 
could seek resentencing regardless of whether the subsection 
under which he was convicted was changed in any way.  In 
fact, a defendant convicted of a crime entirely unrelated to 
crack cocaine would be entitled to resentencing.  Section 
841(b) provides penalties associated with other controlled 
substances besides cocaine base.  So, if we treat § 841(a) as 
the crime of conviction, defendants convicted of, say, heroin 
offenses, would be entitled to resentencing because the 
penalties in § 841(b) have been modified.  That outcome 
would be odd, to say the least.  The Fair Sentencing Act was 
meant to “restore fairness to Federal cocaine sentencing.” 
Pub. L. 111–220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010).  Allowing 
defendants convicted of crimes unrelated to cocaine to be 
resentenced does not further the stated purpose.  It is difficult 
to believe that is what Congress had in mind.6  
 
6 The First Circuit acknowledged this point, observing 
that a “difficult question would be whether a violation 
of § 841(a)(1) involving only a controlled substance other 
than crack cocaine (heroin, for example) would also be 
considered a ‘covered offense.’” Smith, 954 F.3d at 450 n.5.  
The court declined to reach the issue, though, because it was 
not squarely presented.  Id.  Yet the clear implication of 
Smith’s holding is that non-crack offenses would indeed 
qualify as covered offenses under the First Step Act.   
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2. Subsection 841(b)(1)(C) was not 
modified. 
The only question that remains is whether 
§ 841(b)(1)(C) was modified by the Fair Sentencing Act and 
thus, in conjunction with § 841(a)(1), qualifies as a “covered 
offense” under the First Step Act.7  The answer is it was not 
modified and so does not qualify. 
 
Although subsection (C) nowhere mentions a drug-
quantity trigger, Birt argues that “Congress necessarily 
modified the weight range in Section 841(b)(1)(C)” by virtue 
of the modifications made to the other two relevant 
subsections of 841(b)(1).8  (Opening Br. at 14.)  He finds 
support for his position in the statutory text that says 
subparagraph (C) will apply “except as provided in 
subparagraphs (A) [and] (B)….”  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).  
In his view, that means that subparagraph (C) incorporated by 
 
7 It is undisputed that § 841(a)(1) was not modified in 
any way by the Fair Sentencing Act. 
 
8 The same provision in (C) also mentions 
subparagraph (D).  As already discussed, subparagraph (A) of 
§ 841(b)(1) contains in further subparagraph (iii) the 
triggering amount of crack for a 10-year minimum mandatory 
sentence, and, similarly, subparagraph (B) contains in further 
subparagraph (iii) the triggering amount for a five-year 
minimum mandatory sentence.  Subparagraph (D) establishes 
maximum sentences for certain marijuana crimes and is not 
relevant here.  
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reference the penalty triggers in (A) and (B), and thus that all 
three were modified even though only (A) and (B) were 
actually changed.  So Birt frames the issue as follows: 
§ 841(b)(1)(C) applies in two circumstances – first, when the 
specified amount of crack is below the amount that would 
trigger the mandatory minimum in 841(b)(1)(B)(iii); or 
second, when the amount of crack cocaine is unspecified.  
Viewed in that light, § 841(b)(1)(C) was modified by the Fair 
Sentencing Act because the first circumstance arises based on 
the modified trigger in (b)(1)(B)(iii), i.e., the increase from 5 
grams to 28 grams.9 
 
That argument too has some surface appeal.  The 
problem remains, however, that Birt cannot point to any 
circumstance under which someone convicted under (b)(1)(C) 
would have faced different penalties before and after the 
passage of the Fair Sentencing Act.  As was said recently by a 
well-respected judge on the court where Birt was convicted, 
while the Fair Sentencing Act’s increase in the amount of 
crack required to trigger a mandatory minimum penalty under 
§ 841(a)(1)(B) “did, in turn, increase the maximum amount of 
[crack] subject to penalty under … § 841(b)(1)(C), … that did 
 
9 The Fourth Circuit recently adopted this line of 
reasoning, concluding that “by increasing the drug weights to 
which the penalties in Subsections 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 
(B)(iii) applied, Congress also increased the crack cocaine 
weights to which Subsection 841(b)(1)(C) applied and 
thereby modified the statutory penalty” for that subsection.  
United States v. Woodson, 2020 WL 3443925 at *3 (4th Cir. 
2020).  As discussed herein, we respectfully disagree. 
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not affect anyone originally sentenced under… 
§ 841(b)(1)(C).  Put simply, any defendant … sentenced 
under …§ 841(b)(1)(C) prior to the enactment of the Fair 
Sentencing Act would presently be subject to the exact same 
statutory penalty of up to 20 years.”  United States v. 
Roberson, No. 99CR80-1, 2019 WL 6699912, at *3 (M.D. 
Pa. Dec. 9, 2019) (Munley, J.), appeal docketed, No. 19-3972 
(3d Cir. Dec. 26, 2019).  In short, the text and effect of 
§ 841(b)(1)(C) are the same now as before.10  Try as he 
 
10 That is true both for those who were charged with 
crimes involving an unspecified amount of crack and those, if 
any, charged with a specified amount below the trigger found 
in subsection 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).  As to the former, “[b]oth 
before and after the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010, a criminal defendant convicted of 
violating § 841(b)(1)(C) with respect to any unspecified 
quantity of a Schedule I or II controlled substance would be 
subject under the provision to a statutory range of 0 to 20 
years of imprisonment.” United States v. Hunter, No. 
3:05CR54 (JBA), 2019 WL 1220311, at *2 (D. Conn. 
Mar. 15, 2019).  As to the latter, it is a practical certainty that 
those defendants would face no negative consequences.  If the 
amount charged was less than 5 grams, then the Fair 
Sentencing Act changed nothing because § 841(b)(1)(C) was 
always the only applicable subsection.  If the amount was 
more than 5 grams, those defendants would at least in theory 
have been subjected already to the earlier mandatory 
minimum sentences (i.e., those in effect before the enactment 
of the Fair Sentencing Act) found in (b)(1)(A)(iii) or 
(b)(1)(B)(iii) and so have an argument for eligibility for relief 
under the First Step Act.  
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might, Birt cannot change that, and, accordingly, convictions 
under that subsection are not “covered offenses,” as defined 
by the First Step Act. 
 
 The Supreme Court has given something of an 
indirect endorsement of this view.  In explaining the effect of 
the Fair Sentencing Act, the Court has observed, as we have 
here, that it “increased the drug amounts triggering mandatory 
minimums for crack trafficking offenses from 5 grams to 28 
grams in respect to the 5–year minimum and from 50 grams 
to 280 grams in respect to the 10–year minimum[.]” Dorsey v. 
United States, 567 U.S. 260, 269 (2012).  The Court then 
cited § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) but made no 
reference to § 841(b)(1)(C).  That characterization of the 
effects of the Fair Sentencing Act can be seen as recognizing 
that § 841(b)(1)(C), which imposes no mandatory minimum, 
was not modified.     
 
It is unsurprising, then, that many courts around the 
country have concluded that § 841(b)(1)(C) was not 
“modified” by the Fair Sentencing Act, within the meaning of 
the First Step Act.11  We likewise hold that a conviction under 
 
 
11 See, e.g., United States v. Foley, 798 F. App'x. 534, 
536 (11th Cir. 2020)  (unpublished) (holding that “[s]ections 
2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act modified 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), 844(a), 960(b)(1)(C), 
and 960(b)(2)(C)—but, importantly here, not 
§ 841(b)(1)(C)”); United States v. Brown, 785 F. App’x 189, 
190 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Because the Fair 
Sentencing Act did not modify the statutory penalties for 
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§ 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(C) is not a “covered offense” 
within the meaning of the First Step Act.  Birt is therefore 
ineligible for the relief he seeks. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s denial of Birt’s motion for resentencing. 
 
[§ 841(b)(1)(C)], [the defendant’s] offense is not a covered 
offense and the district court correctly denied [the] motion to 
reduce his sentence pursuant to § 404 of the First Step Act.”); 
United States v. Duggan, 771 F. App’x 261, 261 (4th Cir. 
2019) (per curiam) (“The offense for which Duggan was 
convicted and sentenced—possession with intent to distribute 
a quantity of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(C)—was not modified by section 2 or 3 of the 
2010 FSA.  The district court thus lacked jurisdiction to 
reduce Duggan’s sentence under the 2018 [First Step Act].” 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B))); United States v. 
Wiseman, 932 F.3d 411, 417 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Because 
Wiseman was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), 
not § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), the First Step Act[] . . . would not 
impact him, even if he had been sentenced after the First Step 
Act’s effective date.”); United States v. Martinez, 777 F. 
App’x 946, 947 (10th Cir. 2019) (“The Fair Sentencing Act 
had no effect on § 841(b)(1)(C) and, thus, [the] crime of 
conviction is not a ‘covered offense’ under the Act.”); 
Roberson, 2019 WL 6699912 at *3 (finding that 
§ 841(b)(1)(C) is not a “covered offense” under the First Step 
Act); United States v. Washington, No. 1:07-CR-0401, 2019 
WL 4273862, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2019) (same).  
 
